From Empathy to Caring: Defining the Ideal Approach to a Healing Relationship by Weiner, Saul J. & Auster, Simon
123
YALE JOURNAL OF BIOLOGY AND MEDICINE 80 (2007), pp.123-130.
Copyright © 2007.
ARTS & HUMANITIES
From Empathy to Caring: Defining the Ideal
Approach to a Healing Relationship
Saul J. Weinera* and Simon Austerb
aUniversity of Illinois at Chicago and the Veterans Affairs Center for Management of Com-
plex Chronic Care, Chicago, Illinois; bUniformed Services University of the Health Sci-
ences, Bethesda, Maryland
In recent years, “empathy” has been identified as a form of emotional engagement beneficial
to patient care. Although usage varies, the term refers to sharing the feelings of another as
a means of coming to a direct appreciation of the other. Defined this way, however, empathy
may lead to mistaken assumptions and an absence of corrective curiosity: Once we think
we understand what another is experiencing, we perceive less need to ask, listen, and learn.
We propose the process of “caring” in place of “empathy” to embody the ideal emotional and
behavioral approach to patient care. Caring refers to both an emotional reaction to another
and the expression of that reaction in action, independent of the sharing of the other’s emo-
tion or experience. The expression of caring in the clinical context is close observation, pre-
cise listening, and responsive questioning, in concert with committed engagement and
actions directly addressing the patient’s problem, stripped of any assumptions about what
the other might or might not be experiencing.
INTRODUCTION
“Empathy” is probably the most
widely discussed of the spectrum of reac-
tions physicians have to patients; a PubMed
search using the keyword “empathy,” cov-
ering the years 1950 through 2005, listed
7,526 citations. Unlike “sympathy,” in
common use since the 16th century, “em-
pathy” was introduced into the English lan-
guage just over 100 years ago; its earliest
documented use was in 1904 [1].The word
was created as a technical term by an Eng-
lish writer in discussing a concept of art ap-
preciation elaborated 20 years earlier in a
German paper; it is the literal English
equivalent of the original German term for
the concept “Einfuhlung,” which translates
to “feeling into.” It was first applied in the
interpersonal realm in 1909 by E.B.Tich-
ener [2]. Both in its original intent and in
its current usage, the word is contrasted
with sympathy: Empathy involves sharing
the feelings of another as a means of com-
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presentation and/or publication.ing to an appreciation of the other. In con-
trast, sympathy entails simply sharing the
feelings of another [3,4]. It is postulated that
through the physician’s empathic sharing,
the feelings of the patient, the patient’s state
— his feelings and thinking — is identified,
enabling the physician to early appreciate
and investigate issues of immediate concern
to the patient.
DEFINING “CLINICAL EMPATHY”
In dictionaries, empathy is described as
an affective mental process. For instance, in
Merriam-Webster’s Unabridged Dictionary
empathy is “… vicariously experiencing the
feelings, thoughts, and experience of another
…” [5] Dr. Simon Auster describes an ex-
ample of empathy:
“In 1959, I was interviewing a 19-
year-old college freshman as a part of a
study of college dropouts. Her family and
other adults involved with her considered
her to be a problem. She was described as
impulsive and indifferent to her responsi-
bilities and commitments, even those freely
undertaken. Of particular concern was her
presumed sexual activity, which she made
only nominal efforts to conceal. As I lis-
tened, open to the words washing over me,
I momentarily experienced her world. It
was a world in which the present was eter-
nal, and there was no future. In that instant,
all of her behavior made perfect, logical,
sense. I emphasize the brevity of the expe-
rience, because the associated dysphoria
shocked me into self-awareness, re-estab-
lishing my personal boundaries.”
The encounter aptly captures the expe-
rience of sharing the feelings of another as a
means of coming to an appreciation of the
other.The architects of a leading psychome-
tric instrument of physician empathy, how-
ever, explicitly redefine the term as “a
cognitive (as opposed to affective) attribute
that involves an understanding of the inner
experiences and perspectives of the patient,
combined with a capability to communicate
this understanding to the patient.” [6] Their
definition corresponds to others’ writing
about physician empathy [7-9]. In her essay,
“What is Clinical Empathy,” Halpern traces
this transition from emotional to intellectual
knowing to an emphasis on objectivity in
20th century medicine. She cites SirWilliam
Osler’s 1912 essay, “Aequanimitas,” in
which he argues that “by neutralizing their
emotions to the point that they feel nothing
in response to suffering, physicians can ‘see
into’ and hence ‘study’ the patient’s ‘inner
life.’” [10]
Halpern argues that empathy has both
cognitive and affective elements. The cog-
nitive component forms the basis and in-
volves “imagining how it feels to be in
another person’s situation.” The affective
component is what she terms “resonance” or
“emotional attunement:” “While listening to
an anxious friend, one becomes anxious,
while talking with a coworker, one feels
heavy, depressed feelings.” She character-
izes resonance as “a kind of emotional back-
drop” to the process of “trying to imagine
what a patient is going through.” [10] It is a
natural, emotional response to the plight of
another. Elsewhere, Halpern describes an
empathic encounter with a patient in which
she “imagined what it would be like” to be
in the patient’s position and then describes
the feelings that emerged from the cognitive
process [11]. Recently, other scholars have
adopted Halpern’s model of empathy. For
instance, Larson and Yao speak of “simple
cognition” and “advanced cognition” as the
precursors of the physician’s affective reac-
tions [12].
THE TROUBLE WITH EMPATHY
While the experience of empathy in its
standard non-medical definition may have
value in patient care for the limited appreci-
ation it affords of the patient’s mental state,
it is already not without risk. It is one thing
to “feel into” an inanimate work of art — in
the original meaning of empathy — where
no direct information is available and error
(if such a concept could apply) would have
no more significance than perhaps a dimin-
ished appreciation of the work. It is an en-
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encing or feeling what another is experienc-
ing or feeling; that is an ungrounded
assumption, and ungrounded assumptions
can lead to error, compromising patient care.
The “associated dysphoria” described
above, for instance, reflects only the physi-
cian’s reaction to a brief sojourn into the pa-
tient’s world as experienced from the
physician’s perspective, not the patient’s ex-
perience of his own world, which in the
above case was not dystopian.Aparticularly
unfortunate consequence of the assumption
that empathy provides immediate knowl-
edge of the patient’s state is that it provides
a convenient justification for not asking
questions — “If I know what my patient is
feeling, I don’t need to ask” — especially
the kinds of questions that may get an an-
swer that the physician does not want to deal
with.
This potential for error in equating the
physician’s emotions with those of the pa-
tient is compounded further by the cognitive
process of “imagining” proposed by schol-
ars of clinical empathy, with or without the
affective component [13-17]. First, it as-
sumes the physician has correctly arrived at
the source of the patient’s distress. In think-
ing about — or imagining — the patient’s
circumstances, the physician must infer
what aspects of the situation are most impor-
tant to the patient and are driving the pa-
tient’s reaction; depending on the
assumptions and personal issues the physi-
cian brings to the encounter, the inferences
may or may not be correct. It further as-
sumes that based on these initial thoughts,
the physician will react in a way that leads to
identification with the patient’s feelings;
again, the physician’s reactions may or may
not be congruent with those of the patient,
now depending both on a) whether the
physician has correctly assessed what is im-
portant to the patient, and b) whether the re-
action is to the patient’s needs or to the
physician’s needs as they might emerge in a
similar situation.
Of greater concern, however, is the
view of the authors of these and other papers
on empathy that an observer’s experience,
of itself, can provide direct knowledge of
another [9-13]. Such a perspective runs
counter to extensive theoretical and empiri-
cal research on qualitative inquiry. The
physician-patient encounter may be likened
to a “participant-observercase study with an
n of 1.” [18] Like the anthropologist or soci-
ologist in the field, the physician is engaged
in a process of data gathering that requires
ongoing rigorous efforts to identify and set
aside personal bias. The literature on quali-
tative inquiry extensively cautions against
the hazards of imagining the predicament of
the observed [19-20]. The emphasis is on
“constant comparison,” which focuses on
objective validation of what is observed, and
on “reflexivity,” which involves explicitly
recognizing and setting aside one’s own per-
spective [21-22].
In commenting on his brief, sole expe-
rience of empathy while interviewing a 19-
year-old woman, quoted earlier, Auster
noted:
“I have not had such an experience of
another’s world since, nor do I think having
one would advantage me in caring for an-
other. Because in that instant I realized that
I could arrive at the same appreciation of
another’s situation through a systematic
cognitive process that is ultimately more
useful to him: By precisely observing his
appearance and his context, his words (and
this includes the particular words selected
to express a thought, feeling, or action) and
their actions, I construct from those obser-
vations a context in which it all makes log-
ical sense and then ask whether my
construct accurately reflects his experience.
When it does not, I ask how it does not, and
based on their reply, I make continuing ad-
justments to that construct until it is in line
with the other’s reality. Such an approach,
which is similar to the “grounded theory”
of discovery [18], has several advantages
over the kind of direct experience of the
world of another such as I had with that
young woman: First, it assures that I have
an accurate picture of what is happening,
both of the event and of the context; sec-
ond, responding to my questions often puts
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tive on his situation, a perspective that may
be contributing to whatever difficulties he
is experiencing;Third, my questions imply
the possibility of alternative perspectives to
the one he has — a kind of re-framing —
that may point to opportunity and hope.
Rewarded by the outcomes of this ap-
proach, and negatively conditioned by the
dysphoria of that earlier experience, I
haven’t been empathic again.”
EMPATHY VS. CARING
Empathy, whether cognitive, affective,
or both, does not necessarily involve caring.
Just because I say, “I feel your pain,” does
not mean I am strongly motivated to do any-
thingaboutit.NordoesitmeanIwillreactin
away that is responsiveto your needs,rather
thantomyowndiscomfort.Althoughframed
as an antidote to detached concern, empathy
is, in its own way, detached. Caring, in con-
trast, is a sustained emotional investment in
an individual’s well being, characterized by
a desire to take actions that will benefit that
person. Although the word is ancient [23],
much of the literature on caring comes from
the nursing field in the last 40 years [24-26],
based on the work of Madeline Leininger,
who defines caring as “those assistive, sup-
portive, or facilitative acts toward or for an-
other individual or group with evident or
anticipated needs to ameliorate or improve a
human condition or lifeway.” [27]The focus
has been on caring as a set of actions, behav-
iors, or as a “process of action.” [28] This is
consistent with the contemporary definition
ofcaringas“theactionoftheverb,care,”“to
take thought for, provide for, look after, take
care of.” [23]
When we care for an individual, we
may also empathize with them but doing so
is not necessary and may be a distraction —
or, as noted earlier, even misleading. The
focus of empathy is the physician’s emo-
tions, rather than the optimal direct response
to the patient’s needs in the immediacy of
the encounter. The significance of this dis-
tinction is often overlooked in discussions
of empathy and caring. In a recent collection
of essays on caring, for instance, empathy
consistently is regarded as a dimension of
caring. As one author states: “Caring must
address the emotions, and empathy is the
characteristic term chosen to convey the
need for those who do the caring to share,
even if in an attenuated way, the emotion of
the one being cared for.” [29] Certainly, car-
ing must address emotions, the physician’s
no less than the patient’s, but we question
whether it is prudent to introduce empathy,
with its attendant risk of error, as a necessary
component of quality patient care. The
physician’s emotions must be addressed in-
sofar as they influence, at times profoundly,
how the physician ultimately cares for the
patient; of themselves, they are of no conse-
quence, since the path from emotion to be-
havior is so contingent on qualities that vary
infinitely across individuals and situations.
How is caring manifested? How might
we respond when an individual comes to us
with a problem and we wish simply to do
what we can to help them? We propose that
caring in the clinical setting expresses itself
first as an intense effort to appreciate a pa-
tient’s situation by asking the “right” ques-
tions and then listening precisely in a
manner that is unselfconscious, non-judg-
mental, and open fully to the other’s per-
spective. The “right” first question is based
on knowledge of the context of the en-
counter and focused observation of the pa-
tient. Precise listening requires attention to
denotation, connotation, inconsistency, tone
of voice and sentence structure, as well as to
the diverse behavioral signs the patient is
presenting, undistracted by preconceptions.
Based on what one hears and sees, one for-
mulates the subsequent “right” questions. It
is an engaged process, in which the physi-
cian expresses emotion and shares insight
when it is likely to further the patient’s care.
Decisions emerge from ongoing interper-
sonal engagement. It entails commitment. If
committed, engaged questioning and precise
listening cease, then caring has ceased as
well.
The path from a caring attitude with its
accompanying close observation and en-
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trated by the following anecdote.The super-
vising perinatologist at a public clinic
described an incident occurring at the begin-
ning of a busy afternoon:
“My first patient was brought in, a
Hispanic woman who spoke no English.A
5-year-old boy came into the exam room
with her, I presumed her son. He looked
hungry.Adrug rep had visited us for lunch
and left some candy; I went out and got
some and gave it to the boy. I didn’t think
it would do anything for his hunger, but I
wanted to show him that I cared about him.
He ate a piece and turned to his mother and,
in Spanish, said, ‘This tastes better than the
rat we had for supper last night.’”
Through a translator, the perinatologist
determined the family was living in an aban-
doned building, surviving on scavenged
food and rats that they were able to catch.
While the translator assisted in obtaining
needed social services, the perinatologist
met with the residents who contributed
money and a volunteer went out and bought
food for the family before the patient left the
clinic. He also arranged to assure a continu-
ing supply of food until the social services
support could be implemented.
Based on his incidental observation of
the boy, who although was not the patient
was a part of the patient’s context, the physi-
cian acted to communicate his caring, en-
gaging with the boy through a piece of
candy. The boy’s response to his action in
turn prompted questions of the patient, en-
tirely unrelated to the reason for her pres-
ence in the clinic — the “right” questions, it
can be argued, which resulted in a compre-
hensive caring response. In the sense that the
term is currently used in the clinical litera-
ture, one would be hard pressed to identify
empathy in this encounter.
In fact, the perinatologist, a man of im-
posing stature, had been described by his pa-
tients as rarely touching them except to
examine them and, equally, rarely making
eye contact with them, usually just looking
at his notepad as he recorded their answers
to his questions. Yet despite the absence of
any of the behaviors customarily associated
with empathy, his patients had been fiercely
loyal to him, consistently commenting, “He
always seems to know the right questions to
ask to find out what was worrying me.”
This physician’s actions toward that
boy were a demonstration of caring, a re-
sponse to another based on a precise initial
perception of the non-verbal expressions of
the other (the “hungry” look), followed by
an action in response to that perception (giv-
ing him candy), followed further by the
questions raised by that initial interaction;
the process more commonly will entail a se-
ries of questions, each in reaction to the re-
sponse to the previous question, before a
definitive action is undertaken. At the root
of such attentiveness and focus on the pa-
tient are the caring feelings the physician has
about the patient. Such feelings have a per-
sonal dimension in that they are not scripted
exclusively by professional norms. Caring
inevitably leads to engagement on a human
level, transcending the professional relation-
ship, seen most clearly in a physician reach-
ing out to the family member of a patient
such as their child.
Halpern provides an example of an em-
pathic response with which a caring re-
sponse can be contrasted. Halpern had been
asked to consult with Ms. G, a 56-year-old
artist with diabetes mellitus, renal failure,
and bilateral above-the-knee amputations,
who declined life-sustaining hemodialysis
when her husband left her for another
woman. As Halpern approached Ms. G’s
room, she was met by a group of Ms. G’s
women friends who told Halpern, “Ask her
about her husband, that creep.” [11] Halpern
asked Ms. G, “Is there anything besides your
body that is hurting you?” The patient
replied, “My husband doesn’t love me any-
more. He told me that he’s in love with
someone else. He moved in with her while I
was in the hospital. He said that with my
amputations and other medical problems, he
could never be attracted to me.” Halpern re-
lates how the patient’s grief then abruptly
turned to rage against the doctor for bringing
such feelings to the surface: “Why the hell
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me any more questions! Get out of here!”
[11] Halpern accepted the patient’s rejection,
and the patient subsequently died of renal
failure while Halpern and all of the woman’s
physicians, after determining she was com-
petent to refuse dialysis, helplessly stood by.
Reflecting on her failed experience with
Ms. G, Halpern identifies “a more em-
pathic” approach addressing Ms. G’s “con-
flict between talking and not talking,
thinking and not thinking” that she suggests
would have been more fruitful than directly
asking Ms. G about her feelings. We would
have asked Ms. G about her feelings, as did
Halpern, but we would have responded quite
differently. Like her friends — or indeed,
anyone who respects commitments — we
were outraged by her husband’s callous be-
havior and would have encouraged her to be
as well. In response to her statement that she
chose to die because he left her, in a tone
mixing disbelief, disgust, and anger, we
might have responded: “"I’ll leave, if you in-
sist. But before I do, there’s something I
need to say, and even though it may sound
harsh to you, if I understand you correctly,
it’s something you need to hear. I hear you
saying that you want to die so that asshole
who once professed to you his undying love
and commitment can walk off with every-
thing you own and give it to that women
he’s just moved in with! No!What you need
is to get the nastiest divorce lawyer in town
who’ll take him for all he’s worth for aban-
doning this poor, disabled woman — and I’ll
help you find that person! Don’t reward the
sonofabitch! Make him pay! And see how
long his new girlfriend wants him around!”
The response we propose is just one ap-
proach that happens to reflect a heartfelt re-
action to the patient’s situation. Our
objective in expressing our feelings is to
convert the patient’s grief into anger, to mo-
bilize and energize her to defend her dignity
rather than surrender to an unfortunate situ-
ation. What distinguishes this as a profes-
sional response, despite its crudeness, as
compared to the response she might get
from her women friends, is that our anger is
directed at her passively allowing herself to
be victimized, rather than at her husband,
who is unknown to us. Our decision to use
offensively crude, vulgar language (arguably
a boundary violation) to convey our anger
and exhort a course of action is a caring re-
sponse, based on a calculated assessment of
the situation: that bold actions are needed,
since the patient’s emotional situation is ex-
tremely dire and will soon lead to her death;
that she is clearly capable of rage; and that
she is not lacking for support for the cause,
given the number of angry women outside
her door. That willingness to step outside
professional norms when it might save a life
is a hallmark of caring.
Focusing on the patient’s ambivalence
about talking about her feelings, as Halpern
suggests would be the empathic response,
validates the patient’s assessment of the
hopelessness of her situation and enables her
to continue seeing refusal of dialysis as a
reasonable option even as she talks about it
— and her metabolic state deteriorates [11].
In contrast, neither our reaction nor our re-
sponse to Ms. G is empathic; we neither feel
what she is experiencing nor do we respond
to its complexity. In fact, we directly chal-
lenge her with our perspective — a perspec-
tive that comes naturally to those who care
about her, as it did to the friends waiting out-
side her door. Rather than treating emotion
as an abstraction, we respond on an immedi-
ate, human, person-to-person level. Our re-
sponse reframes her situation, transforming
her from victim to potential victor.
CARING AS NURTURANCE,
NOT LABOR
Larson and Yao recently proposed that
physicians consider empathy “emotional
labor” that involves two types of acting: sur-
face, in which the provider “forges empathic
behavior,” anddeep,inwhichthey“generate
empathy-consistent emotional and cognitive
reactions.” [12] They state that the latter is
consistent with Halpern’s idea of “emotional
reasoning” and both have been adopted suc-
cessfully “by service workers, such as flight
attendants and bill collectors” but are not yet
widely appreciated in medicine. They ob-
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these two acting methods, the emotional
labor of empathy requires effort, dedication,
and patience,” and “the cognitive and emo-
tional effort involved in empathy strain the
alreadyoverextendedpsychologicalresource
physicians have, contributing to burnout and
evencausingemotionalpainforsome.”They
conclude that, despite the challenges, “we
hope to establish the idea that empathy is a
symbol of the health care profession.”
In this paper, we hope to turn the tide
away from such a view. First, we question
whether faking certain types of behavior
(i.e., surface acting) is a form of empathy,
since empathy is a feeling. Second, we con-
cur with Peabody’s observation in his classic
talk, “The Care of the Patient” that “the sig-
nificance of the intimate personal relation-
ship between physician and patient cannot
be too strongly emphasized, for in an ex-
traordinarily large number of cases both di-
agnosis and treatment are directly dependent
on it, and the failure of the young physician
to establish this relationship accounts for
much of his ineffectiveness in the care of pa-
tients.” [30] We regard that “intimate per-
sonal relationship between physician and
patient” as qualitatively different from that
between passengers and flight attendants,
debtors and bill collectors. or customers and
other service workers. Third, we question
the transferability of the concept of “ex-
pressing organizationally desired emotions
during service transactions” to such a rela-
tionship. And, most importantly, we ques-
tion the value and relevance of such
emotional effort to patient care.
In contrast to such “labor,” caring is in-
trinsically nurturing. It is enriching, rather
than depleting. It is a response to who the
patient is, rather than an act about who the
physician should be. It is grounded in a deep
desire to nurture others, as identified by Tit-
mus in a study of blood donation and blood
banking patterns worldwide.The findings of
that study ledTitmus to speak of altruism as
the “biological need to help.” [31] Whether
this need is genetically ingrained in the or-
ganism or learned, among social animals it
runs deep. Examples of helping those in
need have been described among dolphins
[32], among elephants [33], and among pri-
mates in the wild [34]. The physiologist
Wright quotes a Talmudic aphorism by a
renowned teacher, explaining his commit-
ment to teaching: “More than the calf wishes
to suck, does the cow yearn to suckle.” [35]
Acentral question is why, given the uni-
versality of the desire to care and nurture, so
many physicians find caring difficult. We
suspect it is because caring leads to engage-
ment, and engagement is frightening. En-
gagement means intimacy, and intimacy
involves risk on a human level, risk of rejec-
tion, risk of commitment, and acceptance of
loss of control.We may chance such vulner-
ability in our personal relationships because
we receive positive reinforcement and emo-
tional support in return. Caring for patients
brings a different kind of reward — the sat-
isfaction of nurturing another individual dur-
ing difficult times.
What are the implications of redefining
the ideal approach to healing as caring rather
than empathic? First, it challenges physi-
cians to confront their fears rather than cir-
cumvent them, promoting personal and
professional growth. Second, it taps into
qualities that promote listening and learning
rather than speculation and assumption.And
third, a natural and concrete process replaces
one that is laborious and abstract, bringing
vitality back to a relationship that is increas-
ingly formulaic. We have all heard it said
about the occasional physician: “He cares
for his patients as if they were family.” Such
openness reflects the best characteristics of
a healing profession and is a direct expres-
sion of the recognition, so well articulated
by Peabody in his often quoted observation,
“[T]he secret of the care of the patient is in
caring for the patient.” [30]
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